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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is a real property case involving (1) dedications of expressly labeled common areas
upon a plat; (2) a subsequent re-plat over-lapping the original plat and obliterating said common
areas following the sales of lots in the original plat; and (3) the common law dedication of a lakefront lot to the purchasers under the original plat. This matter was previously appealed, then
remanded to District Court after this Court determined that the Appeal was premature, absent
further action with regard to the surveys and locations of the easements. However, the issues
raised and errors assigned to the District Court took place prior to the previous remand and
appeal; thus, any and all references to the Record, Augmented Record, and/or Transcripts in this
Brief are to those produced pursuant to 36557-2009, unless otherwise indicated. See also Order
Taking Judicial Notice, on file herein.
This case is on appeal from the District Court's Memorandum Decision and
Supplemental Memorandum Decision entered on June 22, 2007 (Electronic Record (R.) at 30453) and July 22, 2008 (R. at 354-70) respectively, following a five-day court trial, which
concluded on February 9, 2007, and a second court trial which concluded on May 29, 2008. The
trial was conducted pursuant to a remand from this Court in its decision reported as Armand v.
Opportunity Management, Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 117 P .3d 123 (2005) (hereinafter "Armand f'), in

which this Court held that (1) the Plaintiffs-Appellants (hereinafter "Appellants") had a valid
interest in the areas expressly designated as "common areas" on the plat, id. at 714, 117 P.3d at
128; and (2) that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether or not a common-law
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dedication of the lot labeled as "Lot 1O" on the Berven Bay Terrace ("BBT I") plat took place.
Id. at 715, 117 P.3d at 129. Further, this Court held that the second plat, Berven Bay Terrace II
("BBT II") did not replace BBT I:
While Opportunity would like to have the BBT plat declared void so that the
BBTII plat would take its place, there is no support for that in§ 50-1309. Thus,
the unilateral actions of subsequent property owners re-platting part of the
property into BBTII has no effect on the validity of the BBT plat and those areas
designated as common areas.
Armand I, 141 Idaho at 714, 117 P.3d at 128.

As such, to the extent Appellants received

property rights under BBT I and the areas dedicated therein, pursuant to said ruling from this
Court that BBT II does not replace it, BBT II cannot serve to divest Appellants of said rights.
However, the District Court treated the language in Armand I relating to the express
common areas as "dicta," and allowed the entire matter to be re-tried on a de novo basis. See
Memorandum Decision (R. 313-14); (Transcript (Tr.) at 146, 150, 153, 225).
During the course of the trial, in light of the District Court's choice not to treat the
Supreme Court's ruling relating to the express common areas as the "law of the case,"
Respondents introduced additional evidence raising new issues surrounding the original
developer's ownership of the property upon which many of the express common areas lie, (R.
Passim). Also, the District Judge made a visit to the site following the trial, incorporating many

of his observations into his Decision. (R. at 313--18). Both of these actions played a large role in
the District Court's decision on the express common areas, Memorandum Decision, id., and the
Respondents were able to introduce additional evidence which they failed to provide to the
District Court upon their original Motion for Summary Judgment.
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As such, the District Court misinterpreted the Supreme Court's ruling in Armand I, and
failed to apply the "law of the case" upon remand. The District Court committed further error in
holding that Appellants possess only an easement in Lot 10 for "lake access," a vague ruling
which will likely result in further litigation; and visiting the site when it was not necessary "in
determining the weight and applicability of the evidence." Lobdell v. State Board of Highway
Directors, 89 Idaho 559, 568, 407 P.2d 135, 140 (1965). Following the second court trial in May
of 2008, the Court held, without any regard to the intent of the grantor, that Appellants were only
entitled to limited access across Lot 10. (R. at 354-70). Therefore, for the following reasons,
Appellants request that this Court reverse and remand the issue to the District Court, with
directions to enter judgment in favor of the Appellants.
B.

Course of the Proceedings

The course of the proceedings prior to the initial Appeal in this matter are set forth in
Armand v. Opportunizv Management, Inc., 141 Idaho 709, 117 P .3d 123 (2005) ("Armand I"),
and are contained in the record therein. This appeal forms the latest chapter in a legal dispute
which has been on-going for nearly ten years. On July 23, 2002, Appellants filed the Original
Complaint which initiated this action. Appellants then filed their First Amended Complaint on
December 4, 2002, prior to any of the Respondents filing an Answer. Finally, the Amended
Complaint was answered by Respondents Schadel, Blanchette, Opportunity Management, and
Felsing on January 10 and 24, and March 11, 2003, respectively.
On June 26, 2003, Respondents Felsing, Schadel, and Blanchette moved for Summary
Judgment. Following Appellants' Reply and several Motions to Strike filed by Respondents, the
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District Court granted Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment on August 29, 2003, holding
that: (1) the plat was invalid under Idaho Code § 50-1309 due to a lack of signatures; (2) that
Appellants had no interest in the express common areas or Lot 10 on the Berven Bay Terrace
plat; and (3) that Respondents were entitled to an award of fees and costs. It was from this Order
granting Summary Judgment that the first appeal in this case was taken, and upon which the
Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Armand v. Opportunity Management, Inc., 141 Idaho
709, 117 P.3d 123 (2005) ("Armand I").
Following remand, the District Court stated its intent to treat all of statements from the
Supreme Court relating to the express common areas as dicta, and would proceed to trial upon
all of the various parcels ofland which were in dispute. (Transcript (Tr.) at 146, 150, 153, 225).

A five-day court trial was conducted from February 5th through February 9, 2007. At the
conclusion of the trial, the Court indicated that it would be conducting a subsequent visit to the
site. The Comi then issued its Memorandum Decision approximately four and one-half months
later, on June 22, 2007. (R. at 304--53).
An additional trial was then held on the issue of the scope of the easement from about
May 28, 2008 through May 29, 2008. After trial, the Court subsequently issued a Supplemental
Memorandum Decision, which certified this matter for Appeal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).

(R. at 82).

Appellants Siebrwarth then filed a Notice of Appeal initiating

36557-2009. However, following the submission of Appellants' Brief and an initial Denial of a
Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondents, this Court re-considered its decision, and remanded for
additional action. Following the surveys and adoption of the report of the Master/Surveyor, and
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a Motion to Reconsider a part of an earlier District Court determination, final judgment was
entered. From this final judgment Appellants now appeal, and raise a number of issues on appeal
in this matter, set forth below and in the Notice of Appeal, on file herein.
C.

Concise Statement of the Facts

The facts are recited in detail in the text of the Supreme Court's decision in Armand I.
Armand I, 141 Idaho at 712-13, 117 P.3d at 126-27. However, for the sake of convenience of

the Court and the other parties to this action, they will be briefly set forth as follows:
In the late l 970's, Michael Smith (hereinafter "Smith") was the owner of all the property
at issue in this case.

Smith had purchased the property, which was comprised of Lot 35 of

Wright's Park subdivision, in 1979, with the intent of developing the property into the Berven
Bay Terrace subdivision (hereinafter "BBTI").

In approximately 1984, during the course of

developing the subdivision, Smith built two homes in the subdivision, which were eventually
sold, with one of the homes being purchased by Mark Schafhausen (hereinafter "Schafhausen")
and the other home purchased by Knute Eie (hereinafter "Eie").

In addition to these sales,

several of the other lots in BBTI were sold to John Schafhausen, Sr, father of Mark Schafhausen.
(hereinafter "J. Schafhausen"). (Exhibit (Ex.) 75.4).
Following the transfer from Smith to Eie, but before the transfer from Smith to
Schafhausen, a document purporting to forfeit an option to purchase held by Smith in the land
located in Section 7, Township 51 North, Range 3 West (hereinafter "Section 7"), in which most
of the expressly labeled common areas are located, was recorded on June 15, 1984, over one
month after it was executed. (Ex. W). However, Respondents have, to date, failed to produce
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the actual Option to Purchase which the document seems to "forfeit," and the Optionors, Kermit
and Katherine Petersen, did not object to the conveyances of the BBTI lots according to the plat
which dedicated said common areas.
Prior to Schafl1ausen's purchase of Lot 2, he contacted Smith regarding the development
and lake access via Lot 17 of the proposed BBTI plat (Lot 17 later re-designated as Lot l 0 on the
final BBTI plat (hereinafter "Lot 10")).

(Tr. at 333-45); (Ex. 79.2).

Smith informed

Schafhausen that Lot 10 (which was clearly not able to be built upon, and which was previously
part of a public right of way), would be designated as a common area and would provide lake
access to all BBTI lot owners, who would own the lot jointly. Id. Smith envisioned Lot 10 as
the cornerstone of his development, providing lake access, boat docks, swimming, a picnic area
and general recreation to all lot owners (past and future) within the subdivision. (Tr. at 310).
This not only enticed Schafoausen to buy Lot 2, but also enticed his father, J. Schafhausen, to
buy Lots 3, 4 and 5. (Tr. at 349--50 ), Schafhausen's deed was recorded on July 3, 1984. (Ex.
7.4). J. Schafoausen's deed was recorded on July 2, 1984, and contained language granting to
him and to all other owners within BBTI shared access to Lot 10 (and the other common areas).

Id. (hereinafter "Schafhausen Deed"). During this time, the proposed BBI plat was circulating
among county and city offices for approval. The proposed plat designated numerous common
areas, including, but not limited to, Lot 10. (Ex. 79.2).
It was around the same time that Lot 1 was purchased by Eie. (Ex. 11. 7). On September
7, 1984, BBTI was platted and recorded.

(Ex. 79 .2).

The southern portion of the plat,

comprising the majority of the land at issue, contained land that was formerly Lot 35 of Wrights

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

6

Park subdivision. Id. At that time, J. Schafhausen executed consent to the plat, but Schafhausen
and Eie were not asked to do the same. (Ex. lJU). (Mark Schafhauen would record a Consent to
the plat in 1991 - Ex. VVVVV). The plat for BBTI dedicated certain areas as common areas to
be owned by all lot owners jointly, and clearly shows a common area between Lots 9 and 11, as
well as several common areas on the north side of the subdivision. (Ex. 79.2). The common
area between Lots 9 and 11 is a corridor from a cul-de-sac to Lot l 0, and provides the only
access to Lot 10 from Lots 11 through 17. Lots 1-9 have direct access to Lot 10. The corridor
also provides the only access to and from Lot 10 other than through private property. Id. This
corridor was meant to provide access to Lot 10 for all owners in BBTI. Id. The J. Schafhausen
deed made clear that Lot 10, which touches the common area between Lots 9 and 11 shown in
the deed, was meant to be a common area providing lake access to all lot owners in the
subdivision. Id.; (Ex. 75.4). The Schafhausen and Eie lots were now part ofBBTI.
In 1990, Eie sold Lot 1 to Appellants Siegwarth and Schafhausen sold Lot 2 to Plaintiffs
Armand. (Exs. 11.8 and 11.10). The Siegwarths' and Armands' title insurance policies each
contained reference to the fact that Lot 10 had been deemed a common area for all owners of lots
within BBTI. (Exs. 73.2 and 98.1). The Siegwarth and Armand Deeds each note that the Deed
is subject to all encumbrances and easements of record, which would necessarily include the
joint ownership of and the right in Lot 10, as evidenced in a document of record, the J.
Schafhausen Deed.

(Exs. 11.8 and 11.10). Following recordation of the BBTI plat, Smith's

financial difficulties caused him to lose the remainder of the property, excluding Lots 1-5, which
were owned by Schafbausen, J. Schafbausen and Eie, to Kermit D. and Katherine M. Petersen
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and Donald H. and Violet Klages (hereinafter "Petersens" and "Klages"). (Ex. EE). The deeds
to Petersens and Klages purported to convey all of Smith's original interest in the property,
including the property which had already been sold to Schafuausen, J. Schafuausen and Eie, as
well as all of the common areas. Essentially, the deeds transferred the entirety of Lot 35 of
Wright's Park. Id.
In the late l 980's Petersens, Klages and another family, Hedburg (herinafter "Hedburg")
re-platted Lots 6-17 into larger lots, labeled Lots 1-8, in order to form Berven Bay Terrace Two
(hereinafter "BBTII"). In this process, the fom1er Lot 10 (previously Lot 17) became the new
Lot 8. Other common areas were also subsumed in the replat. (Ex. 75.6). Specifically, a large
part of the common area leading from Lakeview Drive along side Lots 3 through 6 and
continuing into a cul-de-sac was subsumed. In addition, the entire common area along the north
side of the development was subsumed. Id.

These areas were clearly marked "common" and

were jointly owned by all lot owners in BBTI, including Appellants. Neither Appellants, nor
their predecessors consented to the rep lat. Id.
In addition, BBTII subsumed Lot 10 into Lot 8, which was now purported to be owned
entirely by the owners of Lots 1-7 in BBTII. Respondents continue to argue this point despite
the fact that, in Respondents' best case scenario, J. Schafuausen and the subsequent owners of
Lot 2 in the BBTI subdivision, Plaintiffs Arm:md, received an ownership and/or usufructuary
interest the lot, and, in Respondents' worse case scenario, all of the Appellants received an
ownership and/or usufructuary interest the lot.

Furthermore, neither the Appellants, nor the

Schafhausens, nor the Eies, ever signed off on the BBTII plat. Id.
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common areas.

(Tr. 349, 350, 353, 386-87, 388-90, 395-96).

The Appellants and their

predecessors in interest also paid property taxes on the common areas and were taxed as if their
properties had lake access. (Tr. at 41 7-19). The Appellants and their predecessors in interest used
the property at issue on a regular basis, open, notoriously and continuously for lake access and
other purposes, from the moment of purchase, continuing until today.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Appellants present the following Issues on Appeal:
A.

¥.'hether the District Court erred in ruling that the language in Armand I

concerning the expressly labeled common areas and the applicability of Idaho Code § 50-1309
was mere dicta, rather than establishing the "law of the case" and thus committed further error in
allowing Respondents to present evidence at trial regarding the ownership of said common areas.
Even if the District Court's determination on this issue was correct:
1.

Whether the District Court erred in its determination that the dedication of

the common areas located in Section 7 was ineffective.

2.

Whether the District Court committed an error of law in interpreting the

Sun Valley case to hold that a mortgagee of a mortgage recorded prior to the subdivision plat is
not bound by the plat as recorded by the mortgagor.
3.

Whether the District Court erred based on its interpretation of the Sun

Valley case, given that the property was conveyed prior to the recordation of the plat and the
recordation of the forfeiture of the property.
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4.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that Smith did not possess an

ownership interest in Section 7 that would entitle him to convey this property.

5.

Whether the District Court erred in its determination that the failure of the

Section 7 dedications affected the Section 18 dedications, and whether it erred in using the value
of Section 18 as the basis to make said determination.

6.

Whether the District Court erred in holding that there was no evidence

showing Appellants and/or their predecessors had previously utilized Section 7.
B.

Whether the District Court erred in ruling that LC. 50-1309 could be used against

the Bervan Bay Terrace I plat while not considering its application to Bervan Bay Terrace II.

C.

Whether the District Court committed an error of law in allowing Respondents to

object to the Bervan Bay Terrace I plat in an untimely manner and/or on behalf of their
predecessors in interest when their predecessors in interest did not object.
D.

Whether the District Court's subsequent visit to the site constituted reversible

error and whether District Court erred by bringing in its own factual evidence to support its legal
conclusions.
E.

Whether the District Court erred in its detem1ination that the Appellants possessed

only an easement in Lot 10 for "lake access," versus an ownership interest.

F.

Even if Appellants' interest were an easement, whether the District Court erred in

restricting the scope of the easement more narrowly than intended by the grantor, and by limiting
the geography of the same based on conflict between the parties rather than the intent of the
Gran tor
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In the Armand I decision, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that "Armands [and
Siegwarths] have a valid interest in the areas that are expressly designated as common areas on
the BBT(I] plat." Armand I, 141 Idaho at 714, 117 P.3d at 128. (emphasis added). Since the
entire basis for the District Court's initial decision was that the plat was invalid for its failure to
comply with the requirements of Idaho Code§ 50-1309, Armand I, 141 Idaho at 714, 117 P.3d at
128, the reversal of the District Court's grant of summary judgment required that section
50-1309 be held not to apply to a dedication which did not involve public streets or rights of
way-the precise holding of the Supreme Court in Armand I. Id. ("The plat in this case does not
contain any public streets or rights-of-way and thus, it is difficult to see how this statute pertains
here.").

However, on Page l 0 of its Memorandum Decision, the District Court, after

acknowledging that the Supreme Court's statement was "clear," stated that it would be
considering the language to be dicta, and concluded that "the only direction from the Supreme
Court was that 'the District Judge's grant of summary judgment is reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings."' (R. at 313 ). The District Court then proceeded to rule upon
all of the issues surrounding all of the disputed lots, including the expressly labeled common
areas, anew.
The law of the case doctrine is discussed in depth in the early Idaho case of Hall v.
Blaclanan, 9 Idaho 555, 75 P. 608 (1904). There, the appellant was seeking a reversal of the trial

court's refusal to consider issues which it had determined as the law of the case after a previous
appeal involving the determination of water rights. On the issue which the appellant had sought
to re-litigate, the Court stated that the "question was directly raised upon [the first] appeal, and
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was squarely before the court, and its determination was essential to a determination of that
appeal." Id. at 609. Furthermore, "whatever the opinion of the court might be at [the time of
second appeal] as to the correctness of the conclusions there reached, or the soundness of any
legal principle there announced, its judgment cannot now be invoked to disturb such questions as
have become a final adjudication in the case." Id. In other words, as the rule is summarized in
the headnotes to the reported version of the case, "the appellate court is bound by its decision on
a prior appeal in the same cause, whether right or wrong." Id. at 608.
Here, as in the Hall case, the issue of the expressly labeled common areas and the
applicability of section 50-1309 "was directly raised upon the first appeal, \Vas squarely before
the court, and its determination was essential to a determination of that appeal." If section
50-1309 did apply, based upon the faulty copy of the plat upon which the signatures were
omitted (although the plat was, in fact, signed), the District Court's initial determination would
have been correct-the plat would have been void for failure to comply with the statute, and the
appeal would have been taken on whether or not a genuine issue of material fact existed as to a
common law dedication of said common areas. However, since section 50-1309 did not apply, a
valid statutory dedication 1 had, in fact, taken place, and it was therefore not necessary to remand
for further findings upon the issue-the express labeling of the common areas on a valid plat
1

While the Supreme Court in Armand I and the parties refer to the private dedication of expressly labeled common
areas as a "statutory dedication,,. this is, in fact, somewhat of a misnomer, as Idaho's dedication statutes mainly
apply only to public dedications. See, e.g., Idaho Code § 50-1312. Rather, the dedication statutes are invoked by
analogy in the case of Smylie v. Pearsall. 93 Idaho 188, 457 P .2d 427 (1969), which held that"[ w)hen an owner of
land plats the land, files the plat for record, and sells lots by reference to the recorded plat, a dedication of public
areas indicated by the plat is accomplished. This dedication is irrevocable except by statutory process. The original
owner is estopped to deny the dedication of public areas indicated on the plat." Id. at 191, 457 P.2d at 430. And
that common areas delineated on the plat become a "part of the deeds" and become "appurtenances to the lots." Id.
at 192, 457 P.2d at 431.
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effected an ipso facto dedication of said common areas for the benefit of the BBTI lot owners,
and there was no need to re-litigate that portion of the dispute. See Smylie v. Pearsall, 93 Idaho
188, 191-92, 457 P.2d 427, 430-31 (1969).

If there were any potential issues surrounding

Smith's ownership of a portion of the property upon which the BBTI plat was located, the time
and the place to raise those issues was in Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment prior to
the first appeal. Since Respondents did not raise those issues at that time, any issues surrounding
Smith's ownership of a portion of the property should be deemed waived, and the trial court
erred in entertaining and considering further evidence on the issue on a remand for determination
of the Lot 10 issues. Thus, this Court should reverse the ruling of the District Court outright
with regard to expressly labeled common areas on the grounds that the holding in Armand I
quieted title to said areas in the Appellants as the law of the case, and should remand to the
District Court with instructions to enter a final order in Appellants' favor to that effect.

C.

Even if the District Court was correct in viewing the Armand I language as

dicta, the District Court erred in holding that the dedication of the Section 7 property was
defective, and that Smith failed to possess an ownership interest therein which would
entitle him to convey said

prop~

Even in the event that the Supreme Court in the Armand I decision did not intend to issue
a definitive ruling on the expressly labeled common areas, the District Court erred in
determining that the dedication of said common areas failed with regard to the land located
within Section 7. The District Court's decision and Respondents' argument with regard to this
property centers upon the fact that Smith may have merely had an option to purchase those areas
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at the time of dedication, therefore, he did not have a right to dedicate. However, since: (1) Only
the optionors (the Petersens) would have standing to raise any possible objection to the
dedications by Smith of the Section 7 property; and (2) even if the Respondents somehow
received the optionors' standing to object, the optionors acquiesced in the dedications and sales,
and, thus, are estopped from revoking the dedication, the District Court's decision is incorrect as
a matter oflaw.
While there is no case law directly on point regarding an optionee's ability to dedicate
land, there is a line of cases from other jurisdictions relating to the dedications on the part of
mortgagors which prove instructive on this issue, most notably the Florida decision in Wei/ls v.

City of Vero Beach, 96 Fla. 818, 119 So. 330 (1928). While an option to purchase is not a
"mortgage," a direct analogy may be drawn between the optionor-optionee relationship and the
mortgagee-mortgagor relationship in the context of this case. 2 It is beyond dispute that the
person holding an option possesses property rights in, at the very least, that option. To use the
classic analogy of property rights, a holder of one or more of the "sticks" in the "bundle" may
alienate or otherwise transfer his own "sticks" in whatever manner he pleases, just so long as he
does not purport to transfer "sticks" which he does not hold. As the Florida Court states, "[A]
mortgagor may of course dedicate land to the public use so as to divest himself of any rights in
the property dedicated." Weills, 96 Fla. at 822, 119 So. at 332. That is to say, the mortgagor
may dedicate his own "sticks" to the use or ownership others, but he may not so transfer the
"sticks" of the mortgagee.
2

Appellants, of course, recognize that this analogy may not be appropriate in all circumstances, most notably option
forfeiture and mortgage foreclosure.
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Likewise, an optionee also possesses certain "sticks" out of the "bundle" that constitute
property rights-the exclusive right to purchase that property for a certain period of time. Since
this option to purchase is the property of the optionee, he may assign or otherwise divest himself
of his rights, which would include the right to dedicate. The optionor also possesses certain
"sticks" from the "bundle," and is directly analogous to a mortgagee.

Since the underlying

rationale of the rule relating to mortgaged land is the maxim "nemo dat quod non habet" ("one
cannot give what one does not have"), and since that is, essentially, the same argument
Respondents offer on this issue, the estoppel exceptions which allow a Court to exercise its
equitable powers in order to prevent a mortgagee from asserting its objection in certain
circumstances would also apply to an optionor.
In this case, although the forfeiture document was executed on May 10, 1984, said

document was neither acknowledged nor recorded until June 14 and 15, 1984 respectively (Ex.
W)-well after the transfer to Siegwarths' predecessor in title, Mr. Eie, on May 25, 1984, (Ex.
11. 7), who purchased in reliance upon the dedications on the then-proposed plat. Under the rules
discussed in detail above, and under Idaho Code§ 55-812, the forfeiture was void as against Mr.
Eie, and, therefore, as against Appellants Siegwarth. Ergo, the dedication of the common areas
by Smith to Siegwarths via Eie was complete and irrevocable, and the optionor, as the
mortgagee in Weills, "by [his] acquiescence in said dedication, ratified such dedication as is now
estopped to revoke such dedication." Weills, 96 Fla. at 821, 119 So. at 331 (emphasis added). If

the optionors truly wished to object to the dedication of the land through their execution of the
forfeiture, then they would have acknowledged and recorded their document less than one month
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following the signing of said document, and would have certainly done so sooner than a full
three weeks following the sale. Eie, and later, Siegwarth, purchased this lot based upon their

reasonable reliance upon legally recorded documents, and the principle that their interest shown
on their plat was valid. There is

no

rule of la\v which allows an optionor, or a mortgagee, to

object to a dedication a full three weeks after the dedication has taken place. Therefore, even if a
common law dedication must be shown vis-a-vis the express common areas located in Section 7,
it has been fully consummated.
Although the transfer to Plaintiffs Armand's predecessor in title took place following the
recording of the Forfeiture document, the Respondents are likewise estopped from revoking the
dedication under the estoppel principle discussed in Weills. Once the dedication of certain lands
has been made, it is irrevocable. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Smylie:
This dedication is irrevocable except by statutory process. The
original owner and platter of such land is estopped to deny the
dedication of public areas indicated on the plat. One purpose of
this doctrine is to protect the interests of purchasers of platted lots
in their reliance upon the valuable maintenance of such public
fil§fl§_.

Smylie, 93 Idaho at 191, 457 P.2d at 430 (emphasis added). The court goes on to quote the

Kentucky Supreme Court in stating: "It is presumed that all such places add value to all the lots
embraced in the general plan and that the purchasers invest their money upon the faith of this
assurance that such open spaces, particularly access ways, are not to be the private property of
the seller." Id. at 192, 457 P.2d at 431 (emphasis added). In other words, since the Respondents
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are estopped from revoking the dedication to Siegv,rarths' predecessor, they are estopped from
revoking the dedication to Armands' predecessor as well.
Therefore, even if there is a problem surrounding Smith's ownership in the portion of the
plat located in Section 7, the mortgage dedication rules apply by direct analogy, and the
optionors failed to object to Smith's dedication of the common areas located in that area. Given
that the recording statutes remain in full force and effect, since the forfeiture was not recorded
until over three weeks after Eie purchased the first lot, it was not effective against Eie, and could
not have operated as an objection to the dedication. As such, Respondents are thus estopped
from objecting to any dedication of the land located in Section 7 on the basis of the Option and
Forfeiture.
Furthermore, the District Court states that there "is nothing in the record to show the
owners of the ground even knew about ... Smith's recording the BBT I plat in September of
1984." (R. at 320). This is contradicted by the express language on the face of the BBT II Plat,
which states that it is re-plat of a portion of BBT I. (Ex. 75.6), i.e., it makes little sense that the
signatories to the second plat would expressly state that they are attempting to re-plat a portion of
a plat of which they were not aware. Further, this statement by the District Court is directly

contrary to the statutory language of Idaho Code § 5 5-811, which states that every conveyance
of real property which has been properly acknowledged and recorded imparts constructive
notice.

Moreover, the testimony at trial and Smith's deposition testimony show that the

Petersens may have also had actual knowledge of Smith's activities surrounding the BBTI plat,
(Tr. At 286) (Smith's testimony that he approached Petersen regarding re-conveyance of the
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property once he ran into financial difficulties); (Tr. at 290) (Smith's testimony that he was in
contact with Petersen); (Tr. at 294) (indicating that Petersen may have been aware of Smith's
original development plans) and, also, the proposed plat had been properly advertised and
approved by the Hayden Lake City Council (Tr. at 263); (Exs. 95.2-95.7, 103.1). Thus, the
District Court is in error on this account as well.
As for the District Court's discussion of the Sun Valley cases and its discussion of the
title held by an optionee, under Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey 131 Idaho 657,
662-63, 962 P.2d 1041, 1046-47 (1998), while this Court in that particular case did hold that the
purchasers of the lot took subject to the mortgage, this is not in conflict with the rule in the
Weills case, nor does the decision defeat Appellant's analogy in this case. In Sun Valley Hot
Springs, the mortgagee and the developer made it clear that the lots were to remain subject to the

mortgage, and that the mortgagee reserved its right to foreclose if the developer defaulted. Id.
Since the mortgagee did not simply watch silently while the developer sold and dedicated
various property within the subdivision, the court correctly concluded that there was no estoppel
in that case. Id. Here, however, the Petersens failed to raise any objection to the BBTI, and did
simply stand by and watch while Smith sold the lots to purchasers, which sales were induced by
the common areas on the proposed, and finally recorded, plat.

(Tr. 349, 350, 353, 386-87,

388-90, 395-96). As such, Sun Valley Hot Springs is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar
with regard to this issue.
On the issue of the title possessed by an optionor and optionee, this, likewise, does not
defeat the mortgage analogy. The estoppel principle has been adopted by jurisdictions which
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follow the "title theory" with regard to mortgages, in which a mortgage operates as an actual
conveyance of title to real property to the mortgagee, rather than simply a lien.

See, e.g.,

Manning v. House, 211 Ala. 570, 100 So. 772, 775 ( 924) (holding that mortgagee which knew

of, and participated in, sales would be estopped from objecting to dedications of certain streets)
and Trauner v. Lowrey, 369 So.2d 531, 534 (Ala. 1979) (reaffirming that Alabama follows the

"title theory" with regard to mortgages). In other words, the principle of estoppel with regard to
dedications has been held to operate to the detriment of holders of legal title to property, such as
the Petersens, rather than simply the loss of a lien interest.3 Therefore, the District Court erred in
holding that the analogy to the mortgagor-dedication cases does not apply, and its decision
should be reversed and the cause remanded for the entry of an order quieting title to the
expressly labeled common areas in the Appellants.

D.

Even if the Dedication of the Common Areas located in Section 7 failed, the

District Court erred in determining that this resulted in a failure of the dedication of the
disputed labeled common areas in Section 18 as well, and the District Court erred in using
the value, (either monetary or utilitarian-or both) of Section 18 as the basis to make said
determination .
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the District Court's Decision is its holding that, due
to the failure of the dedication of the common areas located in Section 7, the requisite intent to
dedicate the remaining portions of said common areas was lacking as well, resulting in a failure.

3

Of course, Appellant recognizes that Idaho is a "lien theory" jurisdiction with regard to mortgages, and the
discussion of the Alabama cases is included for the sole purpose of illustrating the fact that the person or entity
holding legal title to property does not defeat the principle of estoppel to object to a dedication.
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(R. at 333-35). However, even assuming arguendo the Smith lacked the ability to dedicate the

lands located in Section 7, this does not equate to a lack of intent to dedicate. According to the
rules in Smylie, labeling of properties on a plat as common areas, and subsequent sales according
to said plat ipso facto satisfy the requirements of intent and acceptance. Smylie, 93 Idaho at 191,
457 P.2d at 430. The problem the District Court found with regard to the Section 7 dedication
related to Smith's title, not his intent. In addition to the BBTI plat, there has been substantial
testimony and evidence as to Smith's intent to dedicate the common areas, including Smith's
own deposition testimony. (Tr. at 265, 273-74, 275- 77, 279, 280).
There was never any dispute over Smith's ownership of the land in Section 18, which
was formerly known as Lot 35 of Wright's Park Addition. The 1979 deed clearly conveys this
particular property to Smith, (Ex . 79), and none of the issues surrounding his ability to dedicate
which were present with regard to the land in Section 7 are present with regard to the land
located within Section 18. Therefore, since; Smith indisputably owned the Section 18 property;
he expressly labeled portions of said property as "common areas" on the BBTI plat, evidencing
an unequivocal intent to dedicate; and subsequent purchasers according to the plat accepted the
dedication via their purchase.

The dedication was, therefore, complete, and any possible

problems which may have existed surrounding Smith's ownership of the Section 7 land is wholly
and entirely irrelevant as it relates to the dedication of portions of the land located within Section

18. As such, even if this Court determines that the District Court was correct in holding that the
Section 7 dedications failed, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision as to the
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Section 18 common areas, and remand with instrnctions to enter an order quieting title thereto in
the Appellants.
Another basis upon which the District Court sets forth for its determination with regard to
the Section 18 common areas is that, in light of the failure of the Section 7 common areas, the
remaining Section 18 common areas are essentially useless, and, therefore, the dedication
somehow failed (although the District Court fails to cite any authority on this point). However, it
is an established matter of Idaho Law that a dedication remains irrevocable, despite its utility,
and whether or not the property has actually been used or developed.
A clear example is the case of Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of Coeur d'Alene,
Ltd. 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 11

(1989), involving a strip of land dedicated as a public road in

1904, but which had never been developed or put to use. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that, since the District Court had conceded that the 1904 plat was valid pursuant to the statutes
then in effect, and since the subsequent sales of the lots in the plat constituted an acceptance for
the purposes of common-law dedication as well, the dedication became irrevocable pursuant to
the rnle in Smylie. Worley Highway Dist., 116 Idaho at 226, 775 P.2d at 118. This "irrevocable
character of a common law dedication is not affected by the fact that the property is not at once
subjected to the use as designed." Id. at 227, 775 P.2d 111 (emphasis added). Since a failure to

exercise a valid dedication for eighty-five years following said dedication did not result in a loss
of the property at issue, the fact that the common areas located within Section 18 may have been
rendered unusable by a possible failure of the dedications in Section 7 is irrelevant for the
purposes of determining the validity of the dedication. The only possible bearing the usability of
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the land may have upon this case is as it would relate to the damages to which Appellants are
entitled, an issue which was not decided upon by the District Court given its determination.
Thus, once again, this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions to
enter an order quieting title to the common areas at issue in the Appellants, and for determination
of the damages to which Appellants are entitled.
E.

The District Court Erred in Determinin2 that there was No Evidence

Showin2 Appellants and/or their Predecessors bad Previously Utilized Section 7 or the
Section 18 Common Areas.

The testimony at the initial trial, in support of Appellants' alternative argument in favor of
an easement by prior use or by prescription in the expressly labeled Common Areas, clearly
established that Appellants Siegwarth, and their predecessors in interest, used said common areas
openly, notoriously, continuously, and in an uninterrupted manner under a claim of right, with
the knowledge of Respondents and/or their predecessors in interest. See Idaho Code § 5-203
(five-year period then in effect); Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172, 176, 968 P.2d 661, 665
(1998). Mark Schafhausen testified that he used the common areas "all the time" and "on a
regular basis," (Tr. at 352--54), and Appellant Robert Siegwarth testified extensively as to his
and his family's use of the common areas (Tr. at 452-58, 506-08) while Respondents' witness
testimony was conflicting and muddled at best: They first testified they did not see Appellants
use the property but acknowledged they had only finite opportunity to do so. (Tr. at 809, 945).
Further, they testified they did not see Appellants build trails-which took years - but
acknowledge, that Appellants must have built trails as said exist. (Tr. at 845, 863, 919). So
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simply not seeing Appellants use does not establish that it did not occur. Further, Respondents'
witness Stan Brazington testified that there were no trees on the lake frontage, while others
testified it was heavily treed and brushed - some Respondents testified that they had to machete
through it - while others say they walked right down. (Tr. at 781, 793, 794, 866 ). All admit
debris flowing in and collecting said debris is an annual event. (Tr. at 698, 699, 751, 779, 78485).
Also, with regard to Respondents' contention that Appellants were subsequently
prevented from using the areas in question via physical barriers, this is clearly rebutted by the
testimony of Appellants' witnesses: Appellants testified that the fence is finite, leaving access to
the area at issue on either side of the fence; that the berm is nothing more than the natural grade
of the property and that it, too, fails to prevent access to the area at issue; and that they have
always assumed that the no trespassing sign did not apply to them as owners of property within
Berven Bay Terrace. (Tr. at 691 ). 4 Therefore, the Court's determination was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence on the record and should likewise be reversed.
F.

The District Court Erroneously Applied Idaho Code § 50-1309 A2ainst the

BBT I Plat Without Considerini: its Application to the BBT II Plat.
In its initial Memorandum Decision (R. at 317-18), the District Court, in light of its

failure to consider this Court's ruling in Armand I to be the law of the case despite the clear
language therein, appears to re-visit, or at least consider the possibility of revisiting, the issue of

4

It should also be noted that ,Respondents were on notice that they were encroaching upon the upper common areas
as early as May of 2000, when Appellants Siegwarth brought the matter to their attention at the meeting regarding
the placement of the dock. (Tr. at 415, 421).
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the applicability of Idaho Code § 50-1309, although not on the basis that the plat was unsigned,
but that the signatory to the plat was not the record owner of the property. (R. at 319). However,
given that BBT II attempted to dedicate property in which others had ownership interests,
namely the Appellants' and/or their predecessors in interest, the District Court fails to address
the effect of lack of said signatures upon the owner's certification for BBT II.
Moreover, at the very least, the District Court's statements reflect that it either did not
fully comprehend this Court's findings in Armand I, or that it chose not to abide by what is
clearly the law of the case:
This [District] Court believes that the Supreme Court opinion, as written,
does not necessarily hold that section 50-1309 cannot have any application to this
case. The only statement in the opinion is that "it is difficult to see how this
statute pertains here." However, the basis of the decision by the Supreme Court,
to reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, appears to
this [District] Court to be based upon the Supreme Court's conclusion that, even if
section 50-1309 did apply, plaintiffs had nonetheless raised valid factual disputes
with regard to defendants' claim that the BBT I plat was void
(R. at 316). Further statements indicate further confusion on the part of the District Court as to
what portions of the Idaho Code apply, and also indicate that the District Court possibly came
under the impression that, if this Court did, in fact hold that section 50-1309 did not apply, then
no statutory provision applied see. e.g., (Tr. 147--50).
In Armand I, this Court makes it clear that it is simply responding to Respondents'

argument that the failure to conform to the requirements of section 50-1309 rendered the plat
invalid. Since several of the lots at issue in this case were clearly designated as common areas, if
the plat were allowed to stand, the Defense would be left with no basis on which to deny
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ownership in the Appellants, for"[ w]hen an owner of land plats the land, files the plat for record,
and sells lots by reference to the recorded plat, a dedication ofpublic areas indicated by the plat
is accomplished. This dedication is irrevocable except by statutory process." 5 Further, "The

original owner and platter of such land is estopped to deny the dedication of public areas
indicated on the plat."

6

In order to escape this cardinal principle of black-letter law,

Respondents' only hope was somehow to attack the validity of the plat, and, if successful, would
then no longer be so bound as to accept the express dedication on the recorded plat. Since the
faulty copy of the original plat on record in Armand I appeared not have been signed by all of the
parties, the section to which the plat failed to conform would appear to be Idaho Code§ 50-1309.
However, this Court did not accept Respondents' attack on the validity of the Berven Bay
Terrace plat. In explaining its rejection of Respondents' argument, this Court begins with the
plain language of the statutory provision, which reads:
1. The owner or owners of the land included in said plat shall make
a certificate containing the correct legal description of the land,
with the statement as to their intentions to include the same in the
plat, and make a dedication of all public streets and rights-of way
shown on said plat, which certificate shall be acknowledged before
an officer duly authorized to take acknowledgments and shall be
indorsed on the plat.

Idaho Code§ 50-1309 (emphasis added). However, since the dedications at issue were common
areas, and not "public streets or rights of way," section 50-1309 did not apply: "[T]he provision
as a whole appears to relate to dedicating streets and rights-of way for public use ... The plat in
this case does not contain any public streets or rights of way, and thus, it is difficult to see how
5
6

Smylie v. Pearsall 93 Idaho 188, 191, 457 P.2d 427, 430 (1969) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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this statute pertains here." Armand I, 141 Idaho at 714, 117 P.3d at 128 (emphasis added). In

other words, section 50-1309 had a narrow application, and the plat in this case did not fall
within that narrow application. Since the plat was not invalid, the mle of law regarding the
listing of common areas on a plat applied, and "[t]herefore Armands have a valid interest in the
areas that are expressly designated as common areas on the BBT plat." Id.
\Vhere this Court did resort to a discussion of "common law dedication" was m its
discussion of the issues surrounding Lot 10. Since Lot 10 was not expressly designated as a
common area, the face of the plat was not dispositive of the issue, and it was necessary to
examine whether or not genuine issues of material fact existed as to the common law elements of
intent and acceptance. 7

In the end, of course, this Court determined that genuine issues of

material fact did exist as to whether or not there was a common law dedication of Lot 10, and the
case was remanded to this Court for determination on those issues. 8
In sum, this Court did not determine that none of the statutory provisions of the Idaho
Code applied, but simply that Idaho Code § 50-·1309 did not apply, because the dedications at
issue were not public streets or rights of way. Since that particular statute did not apply, the plat
was not invalid for its failure to meet its requirements, ergo, the rule regarding the dedication of
common areas expressly designated as such on the plat was in full force and effect vis-a-vis
those common areas, and title in said common areas were vested in Appellants as a matter of
law. However, since Lot 10 was not expressly dedicated as a common area on the face of the
Armand I, 141 Idaho at 714, 117 P.3d at 128 ("Because the BBT plat does not designate Lot JO as a common area,
Armands must prevail on the common law dedication theory in order to claim an interest in Lot 10.") (emphasis
added).
8
Jd. at 716, 117 P.3d at 130.
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recorded plat, it was necessary to enter into a factual inquiry as to whether or not a common law
dedication took place, and this court discusses the elements which Appellants must show, i.e.,
intent to dedicate and acceptance. Thus, the District Court's Judgment should be reversed to the
extent that it relies upon Idaho Code § 50-1309 and/or to the extent that it fails to apply the
additional statutory provisions at issue in this case.

G.

The District Court Erred in Allowine Respondents to Object to the BBT I

plat in an Untimely Manner and/or on Behalf of Their Predecessors in Interest when their
Predecessors in Interest Did Not Object.
By allowing Respondents to call into question the validity of, at least, the Section 7
common areas shown in the plat, in addition to failing to apply the Law of the Case, the District
Court, in effect, allowed Respondents to object to the BBT I plat following any and all deadlines
set forth by statute regarding raising objections to a proposed plat. Pursuant to statute and the
operative case law, had Respondents' predecessors in interest wished to object to the BBT I plat,
they had a limited time to do so. Curtis v. City o,,f Ketchum, 111Idaho27, 33, 720 P.2d 210, 216
(1986). Furthermore, even if it were possible now to raise an objection to BBTI, there is no
operative provision in Idaho Law which allows a successor in interest to raise said objection on
behalf of the owner of the land at the time the plat is presented and recorded. As such, as set
forth in section II.C above, Respondents have no standing to raise the objection with regard to
BBT I.
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Thus, the District Court's ruling regarding the BBT I plat in Section 7, in addition to the
portions of said plat in Section 18 (namely the expressly named Common Areas) should likewise
be reversed on these grounds as well.

H.

The District Court's Subsequent Site Visit Constituted Reversible Error and

the Court Erred by Brin2ing in Its Own Factual Evidence to Support its Le2al
Conclusions.
At the close of the initial trial, the District Court stated that it intended to conduct a visit
of site of the BBT subdivisions prior to entering a ruling on the matter. In its ruling, the Court
relies upon several of its observations from the site visit, relying upon said visit in its lengthy
description of the topography of the site, its belief as to the impracticability of the original BBTI
plat, and its conclusion that Smith may have been a "total air head." (R. at 339-44). However,
since the information gained from the site visit went beyond simply "determining the weight and
applicability of the evidence introduced at trial," and was "considered as evidence or [had] the
effect of supplying evidence independent of, or in addition to, that taken in the course of the trial,
or supplanted evidence adduced," the site visit was improper and amounts to reversible error.
Lobdell v. State Board of Highway Directors, 89 Idaho 559, 567-68, 407 P.2d 135, 140 (1969).
I.

The District Court Erred in its Determination that Appellants Possessed

Only an Easement in Lot 10 for "lake access" Versus an Ownership Interest.
When determining the nature of an ambiguous conveyance of the a property right, it is a
cardinal rule that the intent of the Granter controls. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404, 195
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P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008) ("In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal
is to seek and give effect to the real intention of the parties."). In this case, the language upon
the Schafhausen Deed, further bolstered by the testimony of Smith, the original Grantor, in
addition to the substantial weight of the evidence on the record, (Tr. at 265, 273-74, 275-77, 279,
280)), makes it clear that his original intent was to dedicate Lot 10 for the use of all of the lot
owners of the (then proposed) BBT I plat. With regard to the nature of the title conveyed, the
case of Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d 1048 (1983) discusses several authorities
which hold that, in the case of the grant of a purported easement interest in which the Grantor
retains no rights to continued use of the servient estate, i.e., for the exclusive use for the
Grantees, the nature of the title conveyed is that of fee simple. Id. at 856, 673 P .2d 1050. See
also Butler v. Haley Greystone Corp., 352 Mass. 252, 257-58, 224 N.E.2d 683, 687-88 (1967)

(holding that, when the intention of the grantor of a beach easement, similar to Lot 10 in the
instant case, is that it be exclusively a part of a development scheme and for the benefit of only
the lots in said development, title may be quieted in the lot owners, and the developer may not
grant interests in favor oflot owners in a second development).
As in Butler, the evidence on the record herein is clear that Smith intended for Lot 10 to
be exclusively part of the BBT I development scheme, and for the benefit of only the lots in BBT
I. There was no intent on the paii of Smith to retain an interest in the Lot either for his own use,

or for the use of other developments beyond BBT I. Therefore, pursuant to Latham and Butler,
this Court should give effect to the clear intent of the grantor, and hold that the conveyance of
Lot 10 via the Schafhauen Deed grants a fee simple interest to the lot owners in BBT I.
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J.

Even if the Interest in Lot 10 was Onlv an Easement, the District Court

Erred in Restricting the Scope of the Easement More Narrowly than Intended by the
Grantor by Declining to Allow Recreational Use in Addition to Lake Access, and Further
Erred in Limiting the Geography Thereof Based Upon Conflict Between the Parties Rather
Than the Intent of the Grantor.
Even in the event that this Court should determine that the nature of Appellant's interest
m Lot 10 is an easement, rather than an ownership, interest, the substantial weight of the
evidence on the record points toward a broad easement, for general recreational use incident to
access to the lake, rather than simply crossing the lot on fixed paths. The District Court itself
even appears to concede that the intent of the granter was to grant a broad interest in favor of the
BBT I lot owners. (R. at 350-'-52).
There is no finding, no conclusion, and, indeed, no evidence which would show that
Smith intended to grant anything less than the entirety of Lot 10 for the purposes of access to the
lake, and that "access to the lake" is anything less than all that may be implied from that phrase.
See Faster 's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 213, 118 P .2d 721, 726 (1941) ("Dedication or

condemnation of a street contemplates the most onerous and injurious mode of use to which it
can lawfully be devoted.") (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Schafhausen Deed states that "the Lake Frontage contained in Lot 10 of
the proposed Berven Bay Terrace Subdivision may be used by the Grantee herein and its
successors and assigns and by all the other owners of lots in proposed Berven Bay Terrace
Subdivision for access to the lake." (Ex. 77.2). The evidence and testimony presented at trial
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make it clear that the "location and width" of the easement is Lot 10, which the District Court
even notes in its own initial Memorandum Decision: 9 "[Smith] intended Lot 10 to serve as a
means for the residential lot owners to be able to claim some sort of right of access to the
lake." (R. at 344) (emphasis added). Interpreting the Schafhausen Deed: "[the] language states
that the grantees and its successors and assigns may use Lot 10 'for access to the lake."' Id. at
347 (emphasis added). The onlv issues raised during this case with regard to Lot 10 were: (1)
whether or not a dedication took place; and (2) the nature of the interest conveyed by said
dedication. Both were answered by the Memorandum Decision: (1) a common law dedication of
Lot 10 did, in fact, take place, id. at 41, 44; and (2) the nature of the interest conveyed was an
easement, rather than title in fee simple. No argument was made by any party to this case that
Smith only intended to dedicate a portion of Lot 10. The "location and width" of said easements
were the boundaries of the common areas and Lot 10 as shown on the plat.

In further support of the fact that the District Court's findings supported a common law

dedication of the entirety of Lot 10, the property interest in which was the nature of an easement,
Appellants would note this Court's citation to the Ponderosa cases. In the Ponderosa cases, the
dispute was over the dedication of a parcel of land, which had also been dedicated for the
purpose of "lake access." Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners v. Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 139
Idaho 699, 85 P.3d 675 (2004) (hereinafter "Ponderosa I"); Ponderosa Home Site Lot Owners v.

Garfield Bay Resort, Inc., 143 Idaho 407, 146 P. 3d 673 (2006) (hereinafter "Ponderosa IF'). In
9

By referring to the District Court's Memorandum Decision in this portion of the Brief. Appellant is not in any way
waiving those errors of fact and law set forth therein, but, rather. is challenging the District Court's conclusion
regarding the nature of the easement following from said finding even accepting, solely ad arguendo, the District
Court's finding the Appellants only possess an easement interest.
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Ponderosa II, cited on page 44 of the District Court's Memorandum Decision (R. at 347), this
Court held that the common law dedication of the parcel of land at issue to that case: (1)
conveyed an easement, rather than fee simple title to the servient land, thus allowing for
conveyance of title to said land; and (2) said easement "[did operate] to estop the owner from
asserting rights o(possession and ownership commonly associated with ownership." Ponderosa
II, 146 P.3d at 676 (emphasis added). Taken in this context, it becomes even more clear that the

District Court's finding of an "easement" upon Lot 10 for "lake access" could not be based upon
any intent to dedicate some small portion of Lot 10 for use as an easement in order to reach the
lake, but that the entire lot was intended for use as lake access by all of the BBTI lot owners,
with the owner of the sen1ient land remaining free to transfer his limited remaining interest.
Since there is no question as to the "location and width" of Lot 10, the second trial in May of
2008 was entirely unnecessary, and the District Court's Supplemental Memorandum Decision
based thereon is not consistent even with its own prior factual findings.
Respondents may raise an argument that an that an easement may not unreasonably
interfere with the rights of the owner of the servient estate. Initially, on that regard, Appellants
would argue that the law of the case would mandate that Appellants and Respondents be treated
equally with regard to their interests in Lot 10, as this Court held in Armand I:
While Opportunity would like to have the BBT plat declared void so that the
BBTII plat would take its place, there is no support for that in§ 50-1309. Thus,
the unilateral actions of subsequent property owners re-platting part of the
property into BBTII has no effect on the validity of the BBT plat and those areas
designated as common areas.
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Armand I, 141 Idaho at 714, 117 P.3d at 128. Given that the attempt to re-plat over BBT I was
ineffective, any interest in Lot 10 on the part of Respondents would flow from their ownership of
the portions of land platted as BBT I located within the boundaries of BBT II, and, thus,
Respondents and Appellants should not be treated as fee-owner versus easement-holder.
However, even if this Court chooses to treat Respondents as fee simple owners of Lot 10,
a broad easement, consistent with the intent of the grantor, would not cause an undue
interference with said interest.. The initial question which arises in such a determination is what,
exactly, constitutes the "rights of the owners of the servient estate," vis-a-vis the Appellants,
which question is answered directly by the Ponderosa II case. In that case, this Court affirmed
the District Court's ruling that the "perpetual easement ... does operate to es top the owner trom

asserting rights of possession and ownership commonly associated with ownership," and,
essentially, the servient owner's interest simply allowed said owner to transfer title. Ponderosa

II, 146 P.3d at 676 (emphasis added).

It would appear that the "rights of possession and

ownership" which the owner is "estopped" from asserting are the right to exclude other from
using the property, and to control the use of the property by others who are entitled to use it
pursuant to the dedication, and under any reasonable interpretation of the decision, Respondents
are certainly estopped from attempting to confine Appellants to a geographically limited path,
and, therefore, the District Court was in error in doing so.
Moreover, "[ d]edication ... contemplates the most onerous and injurious mode to which
[the property] can be devoted." Foster's Inc. v. Boise City, 63 Idaho 201, 213, 118 P.2d 721, 726
(1941) (emphasis added).
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dedicated for this purpose, by any path, would fall within this standard. 10 Viewing Ponderosa II
and Foster's in conjunction with the authorities cited by Respondents, the

on~y

restrictions which

would be imposed upon Appellants would be to refrain from interfering with Respondents' entry
upon the property, and to refrain from causing physical damage to the property. Mr. Siegwarth
or Mr. Armand's use of Lot 10 for the purpose intended by the grantor causes no greater
interference with the rights of the BBTII lot owners than does the use of Lot 10 (in its "alter
ego," Lot 8 of BBTII) by Mr. Felsing, Mr. Schadel or Mr. Blanchette for the same intended
purposes. The only "interference" which the Respondents would be able to assert would be with
their right to exclude, which, under the rule in Ponderosa II, they are currently estopped from
asserting. Therefore, since the route proposed by Respondents is not consistent with the findings
made by the Court, is not supported by the evidence, and is not consistent with Idaho law
relating to common law dedications, Respondents Motion the District Court should not have reopened trial in this matter in order to limit the size of the "easement."
Since: (1) the evidence is clear that Smith intended for a common law dedication of Lot
10 as a common area; (2) the District Court held that the property interest received in Lot 10 was

that of a easement, rather than fee simple title; (3) the "location and width" of Lot 10 is not in
question; and ( 4) the use of entire dedicated parcel by the Appellants in no way interferes with
the Respondents' rights to use the Lot, nor does it cause any undue burden upon the servient
estate, there was no need to issue additional, findings of fact upon this matter, and the second
trial was entirely unnecessary. See also Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Cool,
10

It should be noted that to allow Appellants to travel across Lot 10 by any route would impose less of a burden
upon the lot, as it would avoid the problems inherent with travel across a single path, such as wear, erosion, etc.
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142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 332 (2006) (holding that on-shore uses incident to swimming were
allowable pursuant to a use agreement allowing use of the land for "swimming.").
Therefore, even should this court choose to accept the District Court's determination that
interest conveyed via the Schafhausen Deed in Lot 10 was merely an easement interest versus a
fee simple interest, this Court should REVERSE the District Court's determination that the
easement interest was only a right to cross the property via a fixed path to reach the lake.

K.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Set Forth the Meaning of the Term

"Lake Access" when Both Parties Requested the Same in Order to Define the Scope of the
Easement After Making its Determination and Further Erred in refusing Appellants the
right to present evidence at the continuation of trial related to their riparian, littoral or
dock rights.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) reqmres that the District Court make findings of fact
and conclusions of law following a court trial. Following the District Court's decision to hear
further evidence with regard to the location and scope of the easement, the District Court
appeared to indicate that it would determine what activities constitute "lake access." (Tr. at
1164). However, in the Supplemental Memorandum Decision, the District Court failed to do so.
(R at 354-70). Therefore, given that the District Court erred in failing to define the term Lake
Access as required to do so pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a), after allowing an entire additional
court trial partly for that specific purpose, the judgment should likewise be reversed on that
regard.
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Further, with regard to making a determination as to the scope of the "lake access
easement" the District Court found to exist, at the time of the second Court Trial, the District
Court ruled that it would not accept additional evidence as to whether or not Appellants would be
entitled to place a dock on Hayden Lake, incident to the "lake access" interest found by the
Court. (Tr. at 1199-1200).

While it true that evidence regarding dock rights would not be

pertinent to the location of the easement, it is both probative and material as to the scope of the
easement for "lake access," see I.R.E. 401-402, since, as set forth in Section II.I above, the
District Court was under a duty to make the necessary findings and conclusions regarding the
meaning of "lake access" once it re-opened the matter in order to receive evidence pertaining to
that issue. See I.R.C.P. 52(a).
Therefore, the District Court erred as a matter of law in failing to accept relevant
evidence with regard to a central issue raised in the second trial. "[E]videntiary rulings involving
relevancy are not discretionary matters, and as such, are reviewed de novo on appeal." Gunter v.
Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141Idaho16, 25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005). Thus, the judgment of the

District court should be likewise REVERSED on those grounds as well.
L.

The District Court erred in concluding that it could not determine the

Grantor's intent based on the evidence in the record.
Despite the fact that the grantor, Michael Smith, clearly testified numerous times that he
intended Lot 10 to serve as a common area for recreational uses, (Tr. at 265, 273-74, 275-77,
279, 280), and the fact that, even though it acknowledges that, had the plan went forward, the
upper common areas would have connected the upper lots to Lot 10 (R. at 334) the District Court
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held that it could not detennine his intent based upon the evidence in the record. Id. The District
Court itself even stated that Lot l 0 was unbuildable, and was included such that all of the lots
could be marketed as having access to the lake. (R. at 344). It is also clear that Schafhausen

specificallv negotiated the inclusion of the language in the Schafhausen Deed in order to secure
said interest. (Tr. at 380).
Therefore, the finding that Smith's intent could not be detennined from the record is not
supported by the substantial weight of the evidence on the record, and should likewise be
REVERSED.

M.

The District Court erred in allowing a quitclaim to transfer of ownership

when said quitclaim purported to transfer propertv which either no longer existed and/or
purported to transfer property already owned by other persons -

but did so without the

consent of the persons who alreadv had an ownership interest in said propertv.
In its decision, the District Court essentially held that the quitclaim transfer of portions of
the property at issue was effective, in order to allow the re-plat into BBT II. Under the operative
law, a "quitclaim deed . . . conveys whatever interest legal or equitable, which the grantors
possess at the time of tbe conveyance, including rights inchoate which later may ripen into a
vested estate." Scogings v. Andreason, 91Idaho176, 180, 418 P.2d 273, 277 (1966). However,
the District Court points to no authority (as there is no authority) which would contradict the
proposition that the maxim "nemo dat quod non habet" ("one cannot give what one does not
have") remains in effect in this context. As such, the Quitclaim deeds were ineffective with
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regard to the Common Areas and Lot 10, and do not provide any basis for a rep lat of said areas
by those to whom the deeds purport to convey the property.
Thus, once again, the District Court's findings should be REVERSED, to the extent that
they rely upon the conveyance of common areas m BBT I in which those other than the grantors
held rights to the property located therein.

N.

The District Court erred in finding that the plat of Bervan Bay Terrace II

was a valid plat, despite the fact that it purported to subsume propertv already platted in a
prior valid plat, without the consent of the owners of that plat.
The District Court's Memorandum Decision essentially appears to attempt to avoid
making a determination as to the effect of re-platting property already platted and conveyed to
others, by searching for a method in which to determine that there was no overlap of the plats,
with the exception of Lot 1O/Lot 8. (R. at 323-25). By re-opening the matter of the upper
Common Areas, the District Court (erroneously) found a manner in which to determine that a
portion (but not all) of the BBT I plat was invalid. (R. at 317-22). Now faced with the issue of
the Section 18/Lot 35 property, the District Court (again erroneously) rules that the dedication
thereof was ineffective on the basis of their value and utility, (R. at 334), even though use, utility,
and value have no legal effect with regard to ownership. Worley Highway Dist. v. Yacht Club of

Coeur d'Alene, Ltd. 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 111 (1989). Once again, pursuant to the maxim
nemo dat quad non habet applies, and, pursuant to said maxim, any attempt to plat over, or
otherwise convey, the common areas in BBT I in which the BBT I property owners possessed
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interests pursuant to the principles set forth hereinabove must necessarily fail, and, therefore, the
judgment of the District Court should likewise be REVERSED.
0.

The District Court's determination that the Grantor abandoned the plat of

Bervan Bay Terrace I. made factual findini:s which were not supported bv the substantial
wei2ht of the evidence.
In its initial Memorandum Decision, the District Court ruled that Smith had abandoned

the Berven Bay Terrace I project. (R. at 306). However, Smith's testimony indicated that he had
simply re-conveyed the property back to the grantors once he was no longer financially able to
continue the project himself. (Tr. at 286-87, 291). Further, he had the plat recorded on or about
September of 1984, shortly before he attempted to re-convey the property at issue. There is no
indication that he intended to abandon the plat; thus, the finding should be reversed as not being
supported by substantial and competent evidence.
P.

Whether the District Court erred in 2rantin2 Respondents' Motion for

Bifurcation and Deferrin2 Rulin2 on Appellants' Request for Jury Trial.

Prior to trial, the District Court bifurcated trial in the instant case, choosing to determine
the property rights in the first phase, and damages in the second phase. (Tr. of January 3, 2007
hearing at 50-51 ). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims,
or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the
Constitutions, statutes or rules of the court.
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In this case, given the length that these proceedings have been pending, it is clearly not

"conducive to expedition and economy" to reserve a second trial with regard to Appellants'
damage claims. One of the few Idaho cases dealing with Rule 42(b) is Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho
74, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982). In that case, which involved a "taking," this court affirmed the trial
court's denial of the Motion to Bifurcate, stating:

If no jury had been impaneled until after the trial court had determined
whether or not a taking had occurred, a significant period of time would have had
to have elapsed between the bifurcated halves of the action. Moreover, the
damages portion of the case would have required duplication of proof concerning
the land, what had happened to it, what it had been used for, its size, its location,
and its character.
Id. at 80; 644 P.3d at 1339. Similarly, in this case, should the District Court's judgment be
reversed, "a significant time will have elapsed between the bifurcated halves of the action," and
the damages portion will "require duplication of proof concerning the land." Therefore, the
District Court abused its discretion in bifurcating trial in this case. Given that the bifurcation led
directly to the failure to rule with regard to Appellant's request for a jury trial, that portion of the
District Court's decision should be reversed as well.
Q.

Conclusion of Ari:ument.

Thus, based on the record herein, and discussion above, while Smith's testimony, and
many of the facts as found by the District Court, point to the conveyance of an ownership interest
on the part of the Appellants in Lot 10 and the labeled Common Areas, the District Court,
essentially, only selectively applies said findings, in order to justify a decision that it deems to be
"fair," rather than applying the facts as shown by the substantial weight of the evidence to the
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operative legal principles at issue.

The District Court appears to reject portions of Smith's

testimony outright, which is supported by the BBTI plat, despite the lack of any testimony or
evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, based upon this Court's prior finding in Armand I that the
BBTII plat does not replace the BBTI plat, and that BBTI is valid, in addition to the foregoing,
this Court should determine, unequivocally, as a part of its decision, that BBTII is invalid as a
matter of law, and rule that Appellants have an undivided legal interest in the expressly labeled
Common Areas and Lot 10.
IV.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS

Appellant hereby requests an award of attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rules 35(a)(5), 40 and 41; and Idaho Code§§ 12-107, 12-120, 12-121, and 12-123, as
a prevailing party, and on the grounds that Respondents' defense to this this action was, in whole
or in part, not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
V.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be
REVERSED and the matter REMANDED to the District Court with instructions pursuant to the
legal and equitable principles set forth hereinabove.
DATED this 6°1 day of June, 2013.
JAMES McMILLAN,
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